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Supervisor: Diane Bailey 
 
  Online labor platforms, such as Uber, Mechanical Turk, and Care.com, hold the 
potential to transform the nature of employment. As the number of platforms continues to 
grow, the same term (“platform”) is being used to describe an increasingly wide array of 
services, which belies much of the variability in their nature. In this paper, I build a 
typology that serves to identify the important ways in which the platforms are similar, 
and in what ways they diverge. This typology identifies and analyzes the attributes of ten 
prominent categories of platforms by area of service: Transportation, Housework, 
Delivery, Hiring, Microwork, Therapy, Video, Professional Freelance, Hospitality, and 
Commerce. I find that certain attributes of platforms, such as the duration of working 
arrangements and the presence of rating systems, have important implications for 
organizational theory. Understanding the differences between platforms can help 
researchers understand platforms’ varying potential for altering work and organizations, 
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and how organization theory may need to adapt to accommodate some of these changes 
but not others.  
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A TYPOLOGY OF ONLINE LABOR PLATFORMS 
1. Introduction 
Certain technological innovations, such as the assembly line and modern communication 
technologies, have resulted in major changes in both work and organization, and consequently, 
scholars have had to adapt organizational theory to account for these changes. For example, 
Walker and Guest (1952) studied how new assembly line workers adjusted to the attributes that 
differentiated assembly work from traditional manufacturing work. They found that the 
simplification of job routines resulted in increased indifference, absenteeism, and decreased job 
satisfaction, among other findings. Organizational theory evolved to consider new theories of job 
design to counter these negative effects. Hackman and Oldham’s (1976) research on motivation 
through the design of work is an example: This research helped scholars and practitioners 
understand how aspects of a job can be altered to increase motivational incentives for workers, 
thereby increasing worker satisfaction. Similarly, recent developments in communication 
technologies, including the internet and file transfer protocol (FTP), facilitated the growth in 
distributed teams, which has resulted in decades of adjustment to organizational theory’s 
understanding of work group processes. For example, Hinds and Bailey’s (2003) work on 
geographically distributed teams helped organizational theorists understand why distant teams 
might undergo more conflict than traditional teams. Like assembly lines and communication 
technology advances, online labor platforms could represent a change to the nature of work to 
which organizational theory must adapt.  
In fact, in recent years, many members of the media and some academics have shifted 
their attention towards the “gig economy.” In the gig economy, a “growing share of the 
American workforce is no longer employed in “jobs” with a long-term connection with a 
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company, a job ladder, and mutual interest in the well-being of both the company and the 
worker” (Friedman, 2014, p. 171) and instead are hired for particular tasks for short periods of 
time. Others write about the sharing economy, a “catch-all name for ‘peer-to-peer’ firms that 
connect people for the purposes of distributing, sharing, and reusing goods and services” 
(Mathews, 2014). Some argue that the gig and sharing economies have the potential to transform 
the lives of workers, the labor market, and the nature of work itself. Frazer (2019), a Forbes 
contributor, argues that the gig economy, supported by online labor platforms such as Uber, is 
“reshaping careers for the next generation.” Researchers Burtch, Carnahan, and Greenwood 
(2018) found that gig economy platforms have hurt local entrepreneurship activity by offering 
underemployed individuals quick and easy employment opportunities. Scholars have also cited 
platforms as contributing to the expansion of contingent work, which along with the offshoring 
of middle class jobs and the rise of artificial intelligence, is changing the nature of work in the 
21st century (Barley, Bechky, & Milliken, 2017).  
Within the gig economy, online labor platforms play an important role in facilitating 
connections between workers and clients. Although researchers have begun examining work 
performed on platforms and platform organizations, within these papers the term “platform” 
often goes undefined. For example, Huff and Tingley (2015) examined the demographic 
characteristics and political preferences of workers on Mechanical Turk without defining the 
term; likewise Hall, Horton, and Knoepfle (2017) and Lee, Kusbit, Metsky, and Dabbish (2015) 
in their respective studies of sudden price changes and algorithmic management on the Uber and 
Lyft platforms do not define what they mean by a “platform,” instead simply naming the ones 
that they study. Few generalizations can be drawn about platforms across studies of such 
disparate services, even though these studies ostensibly study the same phenomenon. For 
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example, Mechanical Turk provides a vastly different service from Uber and Lyft and represents 
a disparate form of work. In this paper, I develop a typology to help scholars understand the 
important similarities and differences for work and organization across online labor platforms 
and consider what the implications for such differences may be for organization theory. 
Specifically, understanding the differences among platforms should help organizational 
researchers identify which types of platforms most mimic existing organizations across different 
dimensions, such as their employer-employee relations and decision-making processes. Studies 
on the types of platforms that resemble existing organizations may show that these enablers of 
so-called “new forms of work” are not as revolutionary as the platform companies and many 
current writers claim they are. On the other hand, studies of platforms dissimilar from existing 
organizations may push current organizational theory beyond its established bounds. In short, 
this typology will help support academic theorizing and future research.  
Furthermore, understanding the differences among platforms is important for real-world 
practice. Potential workers could use this typology to learn more about the important issues faced 
by workers on various platforms. Additionally, knowing the differences among platforms may 
help workers avoid those platforms with characteristics they find undesirable. Regulators and 
lawmakers may also find the typology useful in determining to what sorts of regulations platform 
companies ought to be subject. For example, in New York City, Lyft is suing to block the 
implementation of a minimum wage law for drivers that Lyft argues will unfairly disadvantage 
their platform (Marshall, 2019). The number of such legal issues may increase as regulators and 
lawmakers adapt to the changing technological landscape, and having a typology may help to 
determine which policies, regulations, and laws might work best for platforms of each type. 
Thus, I propose the following three research questions.  
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RQ 1. What are the major similarities and differences amongst platforms? 
RQ 2. How do platforms compare to their traditional counterparts, and which types of 
platforms represent new forms of work?  
RQ 3. What implications do platforms’ similarities and differences with one another and 
with their traditional counterparts have for organizational theory in terms of the 
field’s understanding of work, workers, and organizations? 
To answer these questions, I develop and analyze a typology of online labor platforms. Some 
previous typologies and taxonomies have already brought attention to important issues 
concerning platforms. For example, Quinn and Bederson (2011) examined and classified human 
computation systems such as Mechanical Turk and raised concerns about ethics and labor 
standards on such platforms. Similarly, Kaganer, Carmel, Hirscheim, and Olsen (2013) analyzed 
“human cloud” platforms, but in contrast to the work by Quinn and Bederson, their research 
focused on the priorities of clients rather than workers. Finally, Vakharia and Lease (2015) 
compared seven crowd work platforms to Mechanical Turk and found that the Mechanical Turk 
platform has certain limitations (e.g., a lack of support for fraud prevention) that other similar 
platforms did not have. While these previous typologies are useful, my typology differs from 
prior work in at least three ways. First, I primarily develop my typology through a ground-up 
examination of a wide set of platforms rather than a narrow subset of platforms (e.g., Quinn and 
Bederson’s (2011) analysis of human computation systems and Vakharia and Lease’s (2015) 
examination of crowd work platforms).  Second, unlike prior work, I consider a wide range of 
platform attributes, including general attributes (e.g., the duration of service that workers provide 
and whether arrangements are repeatable) as well as attributes concerning information exchange 
and the matching process (e.g., what the client knows and what the worker knows) and attributes 
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detailing financial arrangements and worker incentives (e.g., who decides the price and whether 
or not gamification is employed). Third, and most significantly, this paper uniquely seeks to 
make direct ties to organizational theory and uncover in what ways organizational theory may 
need (or may not need) to adapt to accommodate the emergence of platform work.  
2. Methods: Finding and Analyzing Online Labor Platforms 
I employed a theoretical sampling approach to develop this typology (Strauss, 1987). 
Theoretical sampling involves “sampling on the basis of the emerging concepts, with the aim 
being to explore the dimensional range or varied conditions along which the properties of 
concepts vary" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 73) In other words, rather than looking for a 
statistically representative sample from the online labor platform space, I strategically chose 
platforms whose distinct and unique attributes would expand the range of attributes under 
consideration to ensure my typology covered the full breadth of differences among platforms.  
First, I needed to define the term “online labor platform.” Kenney and Zysman (2015) 
defined platforms as “frameworks that permit collaborators—users, peers, providers—to 
undertake a range of activities, often creating de facto standards, forming entire ecosystems for 
value creation and capture.” Drawing from their conception of platforms, I define online labor 
platforms as online frameworks that connect paying clients to individuals who perform paid 
work of some type, amount, and duration for the client.  
Next, I began collecting a list of online labor platforms. I started this process by making 
note of the platforms of which I already knew, such as Uber, Lyft, and Mechanical Turk. I then 
searched for articles in both popular media and academic journals on the topic of “gig economy” 
or “platform work” and noted the various platforms under discussion. Because this method failed 
to capture under-covered and understudied platforms, I then broadened my search to “ways to 
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earn money online” and noted websites and services that fit my definition of online labor 
platforms. I also discussed my research with colleagues and made note of additional platforms I 
had not previously considered. I ended with a list of over 50 online labor platforms. From there I 
began to narrow down my list to develop a theoretically useful set. 
To this end, I focused on platforms on which at least one party performed work of some 
type, amount, and duration, thus excluding social media platforms. While many corporations 
employ social media teams to work on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, and such work 
should not go ignored by scholars, “work” is not the primary goal of such platforms and I thus 
omitted them from analysis here. Additionally, I aimed to explore the types of online labor 
platforms that have the potential to replace or transform the work of sizable portions of the 
workforce. Thus, for example, I included online therapy platforms and not psychic worker 
platforms despite the apparent similarities in their business models because many more people 
are employed in therapy occupations than in psychic ones.1 I also excluded illicit platforms, such 
as the Silk Road, where the primary work done through the platforms is illegal, such as drug 
sales and prostitution, because organizational theory has traditionally excluded illicit work from 
much of its theorizing. I also narrowed my focus to include primarily platforms operating within 
the United States to keep constant issues related to labor law and contractual relations.  
I then sorted the remaining platforms into categories based on the service provided. I 
sorted the platforms into ten distinct categories: Transportation, Housework, Delivery, Hiring, 
Microwork, Therapy, Video, Professional Freelance, Hospitality, and Commerce. For each 
category, I chose two prominent examples of each platform to analyze so that I might consider 
                                                 
1 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018), there are over half a million mental health professionals in the 
United States, including clinical and counseling psychologists, mental health counselors, psychiatrists, substance 
abuse counselors, and marriage and family therapists. A September 2018 IBISWorld report stated there are slightly 
less than 90,000 psychic workers in the United States (Industry Market Research, Reports, and Statistics., 2018).  
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consistency within each platform type. For example, I included both Care.com and Sittercity in 
the category of Housework. The result was twenty platforms in my sample.  
As I collected my list of platforms, I considered and took note of the important attributes 
of online labor platforms, such as the duration of service, platform fees, and so on, with special 
consideration of attributes that might differentiate platforms from one another. I generated this 
list of attributes from close reading of the platforms’ websites and press releases in addition to 
journal articles written about the platforms. I grouped similar attributes, such as “Who Decides 
Price” and “Wage Guarantee,” together under broader attribute labels, such as “Financial 
Arrangements.” 
In this process, I considered several attributes of online labor platforms that I ultimately 
removed from my analysis. For example, I considered a “Living Wage” attribute, but ultimately 
discarded it because the complexity of assessing what would be considered a living wage 
rendered a determination of this attribute for each platform infeasible. For instance, the cost of 
living differs from place to place, and the platforms may also offer differential pay depending on 
the region or city where the work is performed. Additionally, workers may differ in their work 
output, allowing more efficient workers to earn a living while other workers could not. For 
example, although the platform Mechanical Turk presents itself as a way of making money in 
people’s spare time (Amazon, Inc., n.d.), some highly efficient workers claim to make enough 
income to live on in the United States (Naab, 2019). I also considered an attribute that examined 
how platforms attracted workers to the platform, but I discarded it after failing to find reliable 
data on how workers found out about the platform and what motivated them to join each 
platform. Specifically, although numerous anecdotal articles explained how individual workers 
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first began working (Vahtel, 2016; Abbot, 2016), I did not encounter reliable data across 
platforms on how they found workers.  
 I ended up with twenty attributes across which platforms may differ. I then organized 
attributes uniquely into three attribute sets: General Information; Information Exchange and 
Matching Process; and Financial Arrangements and Worker Incentives.  
Six attributes belong to the “General Information” set: 
• Duration of Service: This attribute examines the length of typical working arrangements. 
Working arrangements can be short term (less than 24 hours), medium term (between 24 
hours and a month), or long term (greater than a month). Some platforms offer a 
combination of short, medium, and long term options.  
• Arrangement Repeatable or Renewable: This attribute examines if the arrangement can 
be repeated with the same client and worker pairing. Possible values are yes, no, and 
N/A. If marked “yes” this indicates that the client can contact the worker and request the 
worker perform an additional task. Alternatively, the client may preemptively allow the 
worker to perform the same task multiple times. If the value is “N/A”, this indicates that 
this attribute is not directly applicable. For the Hiring platforms, there would be no need 
to repeat an arrangement as all jobs are long term.  
• Self-Identifies as a Platform: This attribute examines if the company identifies the service 
as a platform on their website or in their press releases. Possible values are yes or no. 
• Year Founded: This attribute examines what year the company of each platform was 
founded. 
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• Rating or Feedback System: This attribute examines if the platform has a rating or 
feedback system in place. Possible values are no, one way (e.g., client rates worker but 
worker does not rate client), and two way (clients and workers rate each other). 
• Presence of Online Communities: This attribute examines if workers discuss facets of 
their work in online communities, such as forums. Possible values are yes or no.  
Seven attributes belong to the “Information Exchange and Matching Process” attribute set: 
• Who Initiates: This attribute examines which party initiates the work arrangement. In 
Uber, for example, the arrangement is initiated by the client, who requests a ride. Possible 
values are client, worker, or either party.  
• Who Accepts Offer: This attribute examines which party accepts the offer. Possible values 
are client, worker, mutual acceptance (both parties must accept the agreed terms), or 
automatic acceptance (the platform automatically accepts the arrangement). 
• Who Picks or Matches: This attribute examines how workers are matched with their 
respective clients. Possible values are client, worker, or platform. If the value is 
“platform”, I also specify how the platforms makes the match (algorithmically or 
manually by a human).  
• Client Knows: This attribute examines what the client knows about the worker before the 
work has started. There are many possible values for this attribute. Examples of attributes 
include nothing, worker bio, price, gig description, and rating.  
• Worker Knows: This attribute examines what the worker knows about the client and the 
job before the work has started. As with the “client knows” attribute, there are many 
possible values for this attribute. Examples include pay, distance, and job description.  
10 
 
• Background Check: This attribute examines if the worker must submit to a background 
check to perform work using the platform. Possible values are yes, no, or optional. 
• Other Requirements: This attribute examines what other prerequisites the worker must 
have to perform work using the platform. There are many possible values for this 
attribute, such as relevant master’s degree, work experience, a rental unit, and more. For 
some platforms, the requirements may vary depending on the task; for these platforms, 
the attribute is given the value “varies by task.”  
Seven attributes belong to the “Financial Arrangements and Worker Incentives” attribute set:  
• Worker Paid through Platform: This attribute examines if the worker is paid through the 
platform or directly by the client. Possible values are yes, no, and optional. 
• Who Decides Price: This attribute examines which party decides the price. Possible 
values are algorithm, negotiation, worker, and client. 
• Wage Guarantee: This attribute examines if the worker is guaranteed a certain wage 
amount. Possible values are yes and no. 
• Platform Fee: This attribute examines how, or if, the platform charges the worker, with 
possible values yes and now. If yes, I include the percentage take (if the platform takes a 
percentage) and indicate if the worker must pay a listing fee. If the client pays the 
platform fee, I state this information in parentheticals.  
• Negative Consequences for Declining: This attribute examines if the worker is negatively 
impacted if they decline work. Possible values are yes or no. 
• Gamification Methods: This attribute examines if the platform uses gamification 
strategies to incentivize certain behavior from the worker. For example, Uber has the 
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“Uber Quest” feature, which rewards drivers with a bonus for completing a certain 
number of trips within a given time frame. Possible values are yes or no.  
• Possibility for Advancement: This attribute examines if the worker can receive a 
“promotion” or similar status upgrade. Possible values are yes, no, or indirect. “Yes” 
indicates that the worker can receive a new title that confers certain benefits to the 
worker, such as increased visibility or status. For example, the platform Fiverr provides 
“levels” for dedicated workers on the platform. Once Fiverr workers meet certain 
requirements and benchmarks (such as completing a certain number of orders), they can 
“level up” and receive extra benefits. “Indirect” indicates that the platform does not offer 
“official” promotions, but the worker can still increase their status on the platform 
indirectly. For example, on YouTube workers may increase in the number of regular 
viewers they receive, which would reward them with increased income and recognition 
by clients.  
Table 1 shows to which attribute set each attribute belongs. For each platform, I recorded 
the values of each attribute in a spreadsheet. Data collection and recording of attributes occurred 
from February to March 2019. Most of the data came from examining the platforms and their 
websites. For each platform, I searched their “home” page, “about” page, FAQs, and other 
informative pages unique to the platform. Additionally, I examined press releases and news 
articles about the platforms when I could not find the necessary information on their website. For 
each platform I signed up as a client and/or worker (when possible) to discover what information 
is presented to each party. In one case, I emailed customer service representatives with questions 
about the platform’s use of algorithms in the matching system because that information was 
unavailable via other means.  
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After I finished gathering information on the platform attributes, I sorted the platforms 
into three classes: Local, Virtual, and Capital. De Groen, Maselli, and Fabo (2016) divided 
platforms into physical/local services (which necessitate the worker perform the work near the 
client) and virtual/global services (which can be performed anywhere). Similarly, I created two 
classes of online labor platforms to broadly sort the platforms by geographic location of the labor 
performed. Local Online Labor Platforms, such as Uber, facilitate labor within the client’s local 
area and generally have the worker interact closely with the client. Virtual Online Labor 
Platforms, such as Mechanical Turk, have workers perform tasks virtually that can be performed 
anywhere in the world. A third class, Capital Online Labor Platforms, represents platforms such 
as Etsy that involve workers selling or renting physical assets to clients. In this class, workers 
still perform labor, but their labor lies more in the background (e.g., creating the craft, readying 
the lodging for rent) than in the foreground as in the other platforms (e.g., driving the car, 
completing the micro-task). Farrel and Greig’s (2017) work created a similar distinction by 
dividing the platforms into two types: labor platforms, such as Uber, and capital platforms, such 
as Airbnb. Although this separation into labor and capital platforms is useful, I argue that their 
labeling unduly deemphasizes the labor performed by workers on the capital platforms. For 
example, on Hospitality platforms workers must manage their listings, clean and maintain their 
properties, and interact with current and potential clients. Commerce platforms workers also 
have to manage their listings in addition to creating products and shipping them. Creating classes 
to distinguish the geographic location of the labor performed and background versus foreground 
labor is important because these two variables significantly impact the employer-employee 
relationship. Studies of Local Online Labor Platforms can consider the role of face-to-face 
employee client interactions. Studies of Virtual Online Labor Platforms can consider the 
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additional flexibility afforded by the work’s online nature, such as the ability to perform the 
work asynchronously from the client and at any place, and may suggest greater worker 
autonomy. For the Capital Online Labor Platforms, the work largely remains hidden from the 
client, and the worker is not directly evaluated or paid based on the work performed, but rather 
for the quality of the good they rent or sell. This difference between work done and goods rented 
or sold may afford a psychological distance between the worker and client with implications for 
organizational theory. Table 2 shows to which platform class each platform category belongs. 
In the next section, I discuss why each platform class or category may be of interest to 
scholars of work and organizational theory. Additionally, I analyze the attributes present across 
the twenty platforms and discuss why some of them may be important for theory.  
3. Results: Why Platforms and Their Attributes are important for Organizational Theory 
I discuss the results of my analysis in two sections. In the first section, I describe each 
platform category, discuss relevant research on it, and explore why the category may be of 
interest to organizational theorists. In the second section, I examine how platforms differ by class 
according to their attributes, and in what ways these differences across platforms are important. 
In other words, I seek to identify the differences that make a difference for work on platforms. I 
also address interesting or surprising ways that platforms are similar, especially when this 
similarity provides an interesting comparison or contrast to existing or traditional forms of work.  
3.1 Platform Categories, Relevant Research, and Implications for Organizational Theory 
 I briefly discuss why each platform class has distinct considerations for organizational 
theory. I then discuss the platform categories one by one with the aim of highlighting 
implications for organizational theory.  
Local Online Labor Platforms 
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 On Local Online Labor Platforms, workers face a few dynamics not present in the other 
two classes of platforms. Most prominently, they interact directly with the client, which carries 
with it a few considerations for organizational theory. For one, the physical presence of the client 
means the worker must consider how they present themselves to the client. Particularly for 
platforms with tipping and rating systems, the client’s impression of the worker matters 
significantly, and the worker may have to engage in some amount of emotional labor to entertain 
or satisfy the client through small talk and similar acts. They also may have to deal potential with 
harassment or physical abuse from clients. In these ways, Local Online Labor Platforms do not 
represent a large departure from traditional (non-platform) client-facing work. 
Transportation Platforms 
 Transportation platforms (in this study, Uber and Lyft) connect clients (who the 
platforms refer to as “riders”) seeking transportation to workers (who the platforms refer to as 
“drivers”) who take the clients to their chosen destination using the worker’s own vehicle. The 
client requests a ride through the platform’s software application (hereafter, “app”) and receives 
information about the price and estimated time of arrival at their destination. The platform, 
through the use of an algorithm, then matches the client to a nearby worker, and the worker may 
choose to accept or decline the ride. If the worker accepts the ride, the app then gives her 
navigation instructions on where to pick up the client and, after picking up the client, how to 
drive him to his destination. After the completion of the ride, both the client and worker rate the 
other party on the app, and the client may pay a tip and/or a compliment (such as “Good 
Conversation”) to the worker.  
 Transportation platforms, also called rideshare platforms, have provided anywhere from 
24% to 43% of Americans a ride as of June 2018 (Molla, 2018). Perhaps commensurate with 
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their popularity with clients, many academics have studied these platforms. This literature 
emerges from many disciplines, including economics, management, law, and more. For example, 
Chen and Sheldon (2015), writing in the field of economics, studied the effects of platform 
attributes and features, such as surge pricing, on worker habits and labor markets. From the field 
of human-computer interaction, Lee, Daniel, Kusbit, Metsky, and Dabbish (2015) studied how 
workers responded to algorithmic management features, such as driver assignment and surge 
pricing. Studies such as these highlight the need for organizational scholarship that examines 
how algorithmic management affects workers’ actions and decisions and what importance 
workers place on how transparently algorithms operate.  
Housework Platforms 
 Housework platforms (in this study, Care.com and Sittercity) connect clients to workers 
who offer childcare, housekeeping, and other domestic services. Clients, who must pay a 
monthly subscription fee to the platform, can post jobs for workers to apply to or they can 
browse profiles of workers in the client’s local area and request their services. While many 
clients seek consistent and regular workers, clients may also request workers temporarily or for 
one-off gigs. 
 Housework platforms present an interesting set of considerations for organizational 
theory. Ticona and Mateescu (2018) argued that housework2 platforms such as Care.com 
represent an attempt to formalize aspects of the hiring process, such as IRS reporting, that have 
traditionally taken place informally, for example by both parties deciding to forego income 
notification to tax authorities. The authors’ analysis of three platforms (Care.com, UrbanSitter, 
and Sittercity) found that while platforms can increase worker visibility to potential clients, they 
                                                 
2 Tocona and Matessu use the term “carework” platforms. I prefer the term “housework platform” as platforms such 
as Care.com offer services unrelated to care, such as personal assistants and house cleaning services.  
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may also increase worker visibility to institutions such as the IRS. However, such institutional 
visibility is not mandated; rather, visibility to institutions, while encouraged by the platforms, is 
optional. That is to say, workers can choose to document their pay (which is useful for workers 
who need to prove income, e.g., they want to buy a home) or chose not to do so. This visibility 
has important implications on how workers find employment using the platform. For example, 
platform work in this instance provides an interesting pathway for invisible and arguably illegal 
arrangements (i.e., sitters, in the past, have often avoided reporting income, and clients likewise 
have not had to pay into social security pay into social security) into legal arrangements. A 
policing or officiating element arises in Housework platforms that does not appear, for example, 
in Transportation ones because while many nannies were operating invisibly prior to platforms, 
there were not legions of drivers who were doing so. 
Delivery Platforms 
 Delivery platforms (in this study, UberEats and Postmates) connect local stores and 
restaurants to clients requesting delivery of food or other goods. Clients, using the platform’s app 
or website, browse a selection of goods from partnered businesses and can request delivery of 
selected products. The app then uses an algorithm to select a nearby worker to pick up the order 
from the designated store or restaurant and deliver it to the client.  
 Although many studies mention Delivery platforms such as Postmates in their discussion 
of the gig economy, no papers appear to directly study workers on Delivery platforms. Yet, 
Delivery platforms offer new considerations for organizational theory because, unlike other 
platforms considered in this report, they facilitate transactions between three parties (client, 
worker, and business) instead of just two parties. Delivery workers thus must consider the needs 
of both the business and client, and at times these needs may come into conflict (e.g., a client 
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makes a special request that the business cannot fulfill), placing the worker in the position of a 
mediator. Moreover, workers in this arrangement do not represent a single business (as they may 
have done traditionally as formal employees) and have to adapt to the norms and procedures of a 
variety of businesses. This dynamic means that workers may not feel the need to represent the 
businesses to the clients kindly or accurately considering the workers are primarily incentivized 
to please the clients, who rate and tip them, rather than the businesses who have traditionally 
employed the workers and have lost the ability to “fire” them in the platform model of 
employment. For example, workers could, justly or unjustly, blame the restaurant for a late 
delivery, or workers could express to the client a preference for a competing business’s product.  
Hiring Platforms 
Hiring platforms (in this study, Glassdoor and ZipRecruiter) serve to connect workers to 
long term working arrangements in the traditional economy. Clients can post jobs for potential 
workers to search and browse. Workers can upload their resume, preferences (such as 
willingness to relocate or salary range), and other pertinent information to the platform and an 
algorithm can suggest relevant job opportunities to the worker.  
Existing scholarship relies primarily on examining worker reviews left on Hiring 
platforms rather than on the experience of workers and clients utilizing the platform and focuses 
on issues of corporate performance. For example, Luo, Zhou, and Shon (2016), using textual 
analysis of reviews on Glassdoor, found that overall employee satisfaction is positively 
correlated with corporate performance. Similarly, Ji, Rozenbaum, and Welch (2017) found using 
Glassdoor reviews that lower levels of job satisfaction and corporate culture resulted in increased 
financial risk to workers’ respective companies. Future studies that extend data collection to 
interviews or surveys of workers could reveal how the job searching experience differs on the 
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platform from traditional ways of finding employment. For example, the additional information 
afforded by hiring platforms (such as employee reviews and salary information) could have 
implications for workers’ decision making. Additionally, interviews with businesses’ hiring 
managers could reveal how businesses have adjusted hiring strategies to account for the 
prevalence of Hiring platforms. These platforms increasingly may shape workers’ first 
impressions of companies, and these impressions might influence their sense of belonging and 
ideas about organizations’ corporate cultures. New scholarship could consider how Hiring 
platforms influence workers’ anticipatory socialization.  
Virtual Online Labor Platforms 
 Workers on Virtual Online Labor Platforms must deal with some advantages and 
disadvantages not faced by workers on Local Online Labor Platforms. One advantage for 
workers is that they do not have to synchronously engage with their clients. After a client makes 
a request, the worker can fulfill the request at any time of day as long as the task is completed 
within a given timeframe. However, the lack of physical and synchronous human contact could 
result in feelings of isolation. In these ways, workers on these platforms mirror dynamics of 
traditionally self-employed workers who work from home.  
Microwork Platforms 
 Microwork platforms (in this study, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and Microworkers.com) 
allow clients to create short tasks, such as filling out a survey or performing data validation, and 
list the tasks on the platform for workers to see. Typical tasks take a few minutes to an hour to 
complete and generally reward less than a dollar, though some tasks may pay more depending on 
the client and type of task.  
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 As Microwork platforms represent an entirely new form of work, the platforms present a 
wide new set of issues for theorists to consider. For example, Irani and Silberman (2013) argued 
that the design of Mechanical Turk prioritizes the needs of employers and minimizes the rights 
of workers. She found that workers on the platform raised concerns about their work regularly 
being rejected unfairly, slow payment, unfair compensation, and a lack of responsiveness on the 
part of both clients and Amazon to their concerns. The absence of a traditional management 
hierarchy or human resources department on Microwork platforms means that an individual 
worker has almost no power as an individual to address unfair work practices. However, workers 
could organize using online communities and express their collective dissatisfaction or increase 
awareness of dissatisfactory clients among workers. 
 On Virtual Online Labor platforms, including Microwork platforms, work can be 
performed anywhere, which raises questions about the demographics of workers on such 
platforms as demographic factors could affect how workers respond to certain tasks. For 
example, a political scientist may be curious about the demographic factors of survey 
respondents. To help address this question, Huff and Tingley (2015) examined demographic 
characteristics and political leanings of workers on Mechanical Turk and found the average age 
of workers is 32 (compared to the national average of 38), and that the platform had 50% more 
Democratic workers than Republican ones. Knowing the demographic makeup of workers may 
matter for clients requesting other tasks as well, including usability testing. 
Therapy Platforms 
 Therapy platforms (in this study, BetterHelp and Talkspace) connect clients to licensed 
therapists and counselors. Unlike in traditional forms of therapy, in therapy via platforms 
workers perform all of the communication online. Clients with a baseline subscription plan can 
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send daily messages and the worker will respond a certain number of times per week. More 
expensive plans offer clients the opportunity to have live sessions with the therapists.  
 Few researchers have studied Therapy platforms, and all but one of the studies conducted 
focused on the effectiveness of the treatments for the client, not on the nature of work on the 
platform. Whaley (2018), who examined the ethical, practical, and legal considerations therapists 
must make on the platform Talkspace, argued that workers have an ethical responsibility to reply 
to their clients in a secure manner and to accommodate clients’ cultural and religious needs as 
clients may live far away from the worker and in areas that could differ drastically from the 
workers’ in regards to typical norms and beliefs. Additionally, practical considerations include 
making sure the worker can reliably connect with clients and overcome potential technological 
barriers. Finally, Whaley found that as clients may withhold or misrepresent personal 
information, including their name and location, therapists may not be able to contact local 
services or reach their client in cases of emergency or crisis (e.g., self-harm events or suicide). 
While Whaley’s work effectively demonstrates many of the additional considerations workers 
must make on Therapy platforms, I argue that the virtual element of Therapy platforms could 
cause a fundamental shift in the role of counselors altogether. Traditionally, therapists have met 
with clients in person for a set amount of time on a regular and scheduled basis, but workers on 
Therapy platforms communicate daily with their clients. In this way, therapists may focus more 
on helping clients through short term and immediate problems rather than building toward long-
term improvements in clients’ mental health through regular therapy sessions. While no papers 
appear to collect interview or other sorts of data directly from workers on Therapy platforms, 
such research could contribute to our understanding of how workers perceive their changing role 
and adapt to work on the platform.  
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Video Platforms 
 Video platforms (in this study, YouTube and Twitch) allow individuals to post videos or 
stream video content on the platform. If an individual receives sufficient viewership numbers on 
her content, she can apply to become a “partner” with the platform, which will allow her to 
receive income for work done on the platform. Workers may earn money through advertisements 
run on their content and through optional subscriptions and donations.  
 Like Microwork platforms, Video platforms allow for an entirely new form of work and 
raise new questions for organizational theory. While past studies have examined Video platforms 
from a community or cultural perspective (see, for example, Burgess and Green’s (2018) book 
on online video and participatory culture or Shifman’s (2011) analysis of YouTube memes) 
recent research has begun recognizing the novel work performed by users on such platforms. For 
example, Cheng et al. (2014) found that workers on the YouTube platform used viewer analytic 
tools to adjust their video deployment and client engagement strategies to increase viewership 
and revenue numbers. Likewise, Postigo (2016) examined the variety of social and technical 
affordances that YouTube affords its workers and found that these affordances interact in 
important ways. Additionally, Johnson and Woodcock (2019) conducted interviews with workers 
on the platform Twitch.tv and analyzed how workers began working on the platform and what 
the work entailed. They found that a lack of formalized training for this new form of work meant 
that workers had to independently develop their skills. Additionally, some workers worked for 
up to 90 hours a week with no guarantee of a return on this substantial time investment.  
 Video platforms resemble a significant departure from how video work has traditionally 
been performed. Traditional video workers worked with a wide array of collaborators, including 
agents, directors, stations, networks, and more. Platform video workers, who by in large start 
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alone and without a supporting staff, must handle content creation unassisted while handling the 
business and legal (e.g., copyright) sides at the same time. New research could contribute to our 
understanding of how these workers manage all dimensions (business, legal, and creation) of the 
work; perhaps they form contacts and relationships with fellow workers, or they may learn from 
watching other creators’ videos that detail how they found success on the platform.  
Professional Freelance Platforms 
 Professional Freelance platforms (in this study, Fiverr and Upwork) connect freelance 
workers to clients who need professional work done online. Workers may offer a wide variety of 
skills, such as writing, web design, video editing, and more. The matching process between 
worker and client may vary depending on the platform; on some platforms, the worker posts his 
skills and waits for potential clients to contact him, while on other platforms the client will post a 
job and wait for workers to apply to the job or gig. Workers perform or deliver the work 
virtually.  
 The attributes of Professional Freelance platforms have interesting implications for 
theory. Popiel (2017) studied the characteristics (e.g., wages, consistency of work, and user 
profiles) of labor on the platform Upwork and the implications for workers. He found that 
freelancers on the platform face significant trade-offs when using the platform. Although 
creating a profile on the platform is simple, few manage to find work and even fewer manage 
consistent pay. Constant shifting demands for work on the platform exacerbate the precarity 
involved in gig work. Research collecting data directly from workers on these platforms could 
contribute to our understanding of how workers grapple with the inherent precarity along with 
other issues associated with the transition to a platform worker rather than a self-employed 
businessperson. For example, the switch from small business owner to a single profile among 
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thousands of profiles on a platform might lower worker self-esteem and clients might treat 
workers as having less expertise or authority.  
Capital Online Labor Platforms 
 Capital online Labor Platforms differ from the previous two classes of platforms in that 
clients perceive themselves as purchasers or renters of goods rather than employers of workers. 
Clients focus on the relevant products or property, and may not fully understand the work 
undergone by workers behind the scenes. Workers also have somewhat more autonomy when 
deciding how much to interact with clients. For example, hosts on AirBnb can interact with 
clients in person or may refrain from interacting with clients at all beyond the booking and check 
in process.  
Hospitality Platforms 
 Hospitality platforms (in this study, Airbnb and VRBO) allow workers to list properties 
they own to an online marketplace for potential clients to browse for rental purposes. Client can 
search for properties based on their desired rental location as an algorithm suggests relevant 
properties for them to review. Clients can make their decision based on a variety of factors, such 
as the location, price, and photos provided.  
 Hospitality platforms provide some considerations for theory. While the individual tasks, 
such as cleaning rooms and communicating with clients, may bear a resemblance to tasks 
performed by workers in traditional hotels, the roles themselves are different in several ways. For 
one, rather than roles being divvied up amongst employees, workers must play all of the roles, 
including maid, host/hostess, customer service, and more. Furthermore, workers on the platforms 
are renting out their own property and may wrestle with anxieties surrounding a relative stranger 
staying in their property and interacting with their belongings. Additionally, workers can have 
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different intentions and motivations for why they use the platform. Some workers may be 
individuals only wanting to rent out their property occasionally, perhaps for extra income or for a 
novel social experience, while others may operate hospitality businesses and use platforms as a 
way to list multiple properties and manage payments. 
Some scholars have already studied elements of Hospitality work unique to platforms. 
Jhaver, Karpfen, and Antin (2018) investigated the tensions involved in appealing to both 
prospective clients and to an algorithm, and strategies that appeal to clients may not favor the 
algorithm, or vice-versa. Additionally, workers grappled with limited transparency about how 
elements of a listing affect a listing’s prominence on the platform. Lampinen and Cheshire 
(2016) found that the presence of a third party (the platform) eased many of the concerns 
workers had surrounding renting out of property by facilitating the transactions and handling 
disputes between workers and clients.  
Commerce Platforms 
 Commerce platforms (in this study, Etsy and Artfire) provide an online space for workers 
to sell goods to clients. Workers can pay to list items on the platform, and clients can buy those 
items through the platform. While the platforms handle the transactions, the workers oversee 
sourcing and shipping the goods to their respective clients.  
 Some research has examined aspects of work on Etsy and Artfire and has helped 
demonstrate how selling on these platforms represent a departure from selling to clients offline. 
Papers that focused on the experience of workers crossed several topic areas including business 
and growth, community, and the platforms’ effects on crafting culture. For example, 
Blanchflower and Hodges (2017) examined how as sellers grew in size and popularity, they 
faced additional threats, including the struggle of keeping up with sudden surges in demand. 
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Additionally, Kuhn and Galloway (2013) surveyed artisans and found that workers support each 
other through formal and informal networks. Finally, Abrahams (2016) shows how platforms 
like Etsy have blurred the lines between amateur and professional crafting. Unexplored by these 
studies is how the very act of selling online differs from in-person selling. Importantly, the 
personal interaction between buyer and seller largely disappears. While the worker no longer 
must deal with in person criticism or confrontation, the worker no longer has as much intimacy 
with the client, an aspect that the worker may have valued. And while in-person disparaging 
remarks may hurt a worker’s feelings, the online comments and reviews could potentially cause 
as much or more damage to their psychic, akin to how cyberbullying can have more damaging 
effects than in-person bulling. One additional change for workers selling on platforms is that 
workers can no longer rely on in-person conversation and negotiation but instead utilize static 
photos and descriptions of products. 
3.2 Platforms and Their Attributes 
I developed a series of tables that provide information on each platform and the important 
attributes that help illustrate the ways platforms differ, and, for certain attributes, fail to differ. 
For each class of platforms (Local Labor, Virtual Labor, Capital Labor), I created three tables, 
for a total of nine tables. Each table examines one set of attributes (General Information, 
Information Exchange and Matching Process, and Financial Arrangements and Worker 
Incentives) for the given class of platforms. The resulting tables (3-11) can be found at the end of 
this paper. Here I analyze the results for each attribute, and I offer a brief explanation of why the 
attribute may be important for organizational theory. I also examine and discuss the differences 
in attributes’ values for each class. 
I begin my analysis with the six attributes in the General Information attribute set: 
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 Duration of service: The majority of platforms (14 out of 20) offer short term (less than 
24 hours) working arrangements, though only eight of the platforms exclusively offer short term 
options. Half of the platforms offer medium term (24 hours to a month) working arrangements, 
but no platform solely offers medium term options. Nine out of 20 platforms provided a long-
term option, though only two do so exclusively. Platforms within the same category tended to 
have the same duration options (with only Professional Freelance platforms having incongruent 
options), though platforms within the same class had a mix of options with no discernable 
pattern. 
 The duration of service plays an important role in determining to what degree a platform 
enables new forms of work. Short- and medium-term working arrangements contribute more to 
the effects of the gig economy where workers must string together smaller gigs to earn a living. 
In addition to not providing a guaranteed source of income, these short-term arrangements do not 
offer many of the same benefits as long term employment options, such as unemployment 
insurance. If the number of workers on platforms with mostly short-term arrangements increases 
substantially, this increase may represent a shift in the economy. The implications for 
organizational theory are clear: to the extent that platform work is characterized by short term 
working arrangements, it appears to represent a striking lessening of the social contract between 
employer (here, client) and worker.  
 Arrangement Repeatable or Renewable: Sixteen out of the 20 platforms allow the 
same client and worker to repeat a given job with the same client. Only two categories of 
platforms, Transportation and Delivery platforms, fail to offer repeatable arrangements. Notably, 
both of those platform categories fall under the Local Online Labor Platform class. The lack of 
repeatable options for the former platform category, Delivery platforms, likely has few 
27 
 
implications as delivery workers traditionally do not form notable relationships with their clients, 
but a lack of repeatable options could have implications for the latter category, transportation 
workers. In traditional transportation settings, if a client forms a relationship with, say, a standard 
taxi or limousine driver, the client can request the workers information and request him for future 
rides. Drivers could theoretically derive a sense of positive affect and job satisfaction from 
providing regular rides to favored clients. Conversely, on the transportation platforms, clients 
cannot request individual drivers for a trip or schedule future rides with specific drivers. 
A repeatable arrangement may mediate some of the theoretical effects of the “gig 
economy.” On platforms with repeatable arrangements, the worker has the capability to form 
relationships with their employer (here, client) in the same manner that they could in traditional 
working arrangements. The presence of repeatable arrangements across most of the platforms 
may allow for workers to build some of the relationships that workers might experience in 
traditional working environments. However, the omnipresence of the platform makes finding 
new clients and forming new relationships easier than ever, so clients may feel less obliged to 
stick with  
 Self-Identifies as a Platform: Every platform self-identifies as a platform, making it the 
only consistent value for an attribute across all of the platforms examined. This consistency helps 
reinforce the idea that “platform” is a fitting umbrella term to describe this set of somewhat 
disparate services. Furthermore, while each platform uses the term platform to refer to itself in 
some capacity, some use the term more frequently and prominently than others. Care.com calls 
itself a “family care platform” in its “about” pages, while the platforms Fiverr and Mechanical 
Turk generally prefer the term “online marketplace” and only use “platform” occasionally and in 
less visible locations, such as in the terms of service.  
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 The platforms often make efforts to emphasize that they are a platform and not an 
employer. Sittercity, for example, explicitly states that they “do not employ you in any way.” In 
this way, platforms position themselves as a “third party” within the social contract between 
clients and workers. While platforms may not be employers in the traditional sense, they exert 
significantly more control over the worker than the client does. Disappointing a client may result 
in poor reviews or lost wages (among other potential consequences for the worker), but upsetting 
the platform can result in the worker losing their opportunity to work on the platform altogether. 
This arrangement is especially salient for platforms without prominent competitors that might 
provide similar opportunities for workers. Even if platforms do not consider themselves 
employers, only the platforms themselves possess the ability to “fire” a worker or significantly 
police her behavior over time. Perhaps platforms could best be viewed as agents that connect 
clients and workers. Nevertheless, while there are many agents whom workers can chose to work 
with, there are a limited number of platforms in each category who can match workers to a 
sufficient number of potential clients. This quasi-monopoly grants platforms a huge degree of 
control with comparatively little oversight.  
 Year Founded: The platforms examined were founded within a ten-year period from 
2005 and 2015 with only two exceptions: VRBO, which was founded in 1995, and Sittercity, 
which was founded in 2001. The Capital Labor platforms generally were founded earlier than the 
other two classes of platforms, possibly due to their similarity to traditional shops and hotels and 
the fact that they do not require smartphone apps, which were not widespread until later. The 
founding dates provide some insight into the timeline of the gig economy, though the limited 
sample size prevents concrete analysis.  
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 Rating or Feedback Systems: Only four of the platforms do not have a rating or a rating 
system, and only Therapy platforms universally lack a rating system, perhaps due to the 
incentive that may place on the therapist to avoid giving difficult yet necessary counsel. Rating 
systems can come in the form of star ratings (e.g., transportation platforms) or a binary “approve 
or disapprove” system (e.g., Mechanical Turk and YouTube). Nine of the platforms only 
facilitate one-way feedback that allow clients to evaluate workers’ performance. One-way 
systems potentially represent risk for workers who lack ways of determining if a potential client 
may treat workers unfairly or have unsuitable working conditions. Seven of the platforms offer 
two-way feedback systems, which additionally allow workers to evaluate clients. Two-way 
feedback systems help prevent clients from treating workers poorly, as lowly rated clients may 
face difficulties finding workers or be removed from the platform entirely.  
 Some scholars have written about the effects of rating systems on platforms. On the Uber 
platform, the rating system produces a homogenizing effect (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). In other 
words, the rating system encourages workers to deliver standardized experience over a novel one 
(i.e., a driver may feel dissuaded from designing a car’s interior in a flavorful or ostentatious 
manner out of fear of alienating a client and causing a low rating). If drivers fail to conform to a 
certain norm expected by clients, they may face penalties in the form of low ratings, and low 
average ratings may result in a worker’s removal from the platform. This additional level of 
control exerted by the rating systems runs contrary to narratives of freedom and flexibility 
presented by Uber (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016) and other platforms.  
 Tadelis (2016) wrote about rating systems on platforms more broadly. Review and 
feedback systems, such as those present on the platforms, facilitate trust between clients and 
workers. However, the rating systems may be limited by a number of biases that cause user-
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generated rating systems to not reflect the actual quality of the service or product (Tadelis, 
2016). For example, a reviewer may avoid leaving a negative review out of fear of retaliation 
from the aggrieved party, though some platforms, such as Uber, mitigate this effect by 
concealing individual ratings. Tadelis also pointed out that fake reviews can also cause rating 
systems to inaccurately reflect quality, though platforms increasingly require confirmed 
purchases before a client can leave a review. Reviewers may also have implicit or explicit biases 
against people of certain demographics, which can cause workers or clients to receive unfair 
ratings. 
In addition to their homogenizing effects and their proneness to bias, rating systems also 
offload worker evaluation responsibilities traditionally delegated to managers within 
organizations (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). In typical working arrangements, a manager monitors 
and evaluates an employee over time, yet on platforms working arrangements often last less than 
a month. Rating systems provide a way to evaluate the workers over time as they move across 
employers from job to job. Organizational theory has previously adapted to accommodate 
increases in the amount and scope of employee evaluations. Prior scholars have written about the 
rise of an “audit culture,” in which the increasing presence of auditing tools has reshaped 
working environments and influencing worker behaviors (Shore, 2008; Shore & Wright, 2015). 
Evaluation in traditional working environments has largely been quantitative and narratively 
based and performed by a range of people (e.g., bosses and employees) of whom the worker has 
some familiarity with. However, reviews and ratings on platforms are largely quantitative, 
performed by temporary clients, and completed in seconds. As an added bonus for the platforms, 
the clients perform this evaluation for free.  
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Finally, it is important to note that not all platforms utilize the ratings in the same way. 
Uber requires its workers to maintain a certain star rating (the exact requirements may vary by 
area due to cultural differences) while other platforms do not maintain such a requirement and 
instead provide the rating system as a tool for customers to view when considering whether to 
hire a worker. Some platforms, such as the Delivery platform Postmates, ostensibly do not 
consider the rating given by the client at all, as the platform does not use ratings as a metric to 
evaluate worker performance nor may clients view the rating of the worker.  
 Presence of Online Communities: Fourteen out of the 20 platforms have online 
communities where workers (and clients, in some cases) can discuss aspects of their work on the 
platform. Some platforms, like Care.com, host these forums directly on the platform, which may 
increase the forum’s visibility, but also affords platforms the ability to censor criticisms of the 
platform and remove unruly users. Other forums take place on third party websites. For instance, 
the subreddit /r/mturk provides a place for workers to share tips, stories, memes, and other 
content relevant to the Mechanical Turk platform. Workers in traditional work environments 
often have managers and peers who they work in close proximity with and can consult for 
advice; online communities may provide a substitute for the interpersonal relationships that 
workers might form with peers in traditional workplace. Nevertheless, these relationships may 
feel less personal, and are also subject to monitoring by clients and employees of the platforms. 
Next, I begin my analysis for the seven attributes in the Information Exchange and 
Matching Process attribute set: 
Who Initiates Transaction and Who Accepts Offer: I find that these two attributes do 
not differ greatly from their traditional counterparts and therefore are less likely to be of interest 
to organizational theory. Fifteen out of the 20 platforms require the client to initiate the working 
32 
 
arrangement, which largely mirrors how such transactions would work traditionally. The three 
platforms that allow either party to initiate the working arrangement might provide an interesting 
exception that differs from traditional counterparts. On these platforms, both parties must market 
themselves to the other party, which could affect how workers interact with the platform. Do 
they focus on applying to jobs, or wait for clients to request their services? 
Who Picks or Matches: Six of the platforms match the clients to workers automatically 
rather than having the worker or client choose their counterpart. The platform taking control of 
the matching process marks a significant departure from traditional practices and places the 
platform in an important position of power. Five of those platforms used an algorithm to match 
the parties, which raises questions of transparency of how the algorithm works (Faraj, Pachidi, 
and Sayegh, 2018; Gal, Jensen, & Stein, 2017). Instead of workers marketing their skills to 
potential clients, like they have done traditionally, they must conform to the predilections of an 
algorithm with inscrutable preferences (Jhaver et al., 2018). One platform had an entirely unique 
matching process: On the Therapy platform Talkspace, clients can opt to have a human 
“matching expert” connect them with a therapist based on a short conversation with the matching 
expert to determine the clients’ needs. It may be interesting to study how workers appeal to a 
human matcher on the platform, though given that this arrangement appears to be an outlier, it 
may be of lower priority and interest to researchers. 
Client Knows: The amount of information available to clients varies across platform 
categories, and platforms with longer durations of service generally provided more information 
to clients. For platforms with long term arrangements, such as Housework platforms, the client 
can see the workers’ skills, experience, education, payment preferences, work history, skills, 
certifications, and more. The high amount of information available may make clients surer of 
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their hiring decisions, especially when platforms can verify the information. In contrast, 
platforms with short term arrangements provided minimal information to clients about the 
workers. For example, clients on Microwork platforms could see almost no information about 
the clients completing the task. Irani and Silberman (2013) argued that Mechanical Turk 
intentionally minimizes and hides the humans completing the work on the platform. They make 
the critique “by hiding workers behind web forms and APIs, [Mechanical Turk] helps employers 
see themselves as builders of innovative technologies, rather than employers unconcerned with 
working conditions” (p. 4). In other words, by hiding information that reveals the humanity of 
the worker, platforms may reduce the guilt felt by clients utilizing platforms that treat workers 
poorly.  
Worker Knows: The amount of information available to the worker varies highly by 
platform type. Some platforms offer more information to clients than to workers. Workers on 
housework platforms have expressed frustration at this asymmetry: Workers felt that while 
clients had ample information about the workers, workers lacked enough information to properly 
scrutinize clients (Ticona & Mateescu, 2018). However, providing the worker with too much 
information could prove problematic. For example, Ge, Knittel, MacKenzie, and Zoepf (2016) 
found that African American passengers on Uber and Lyft faced longer waiting times and more 
frequent trip cancellations.  
The information provided to platform workers may be different than the information 
available to their traditional counterparts. Platforms may offer the worker more information or 
less information than they would receive traditionally, and the amount of information a worker 
has can influence their behavior. Uber drivers, for example, have less information available when 
making their decision of whether or not to accept a ride request than traditional taxi or limo 
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drivers. For example, Uber drivers do not know the pickup or drop-off location of the client 
before accepting the request, while taxi drivers do. This absence of information could lead to 
Uber drivers potentially accepting rides to locations where they do not feel safe. To summarize, 
worker knowledge is important to organizational theory insofar that it differs from the 
information normally available to workers in their traditional equivalents as it may affect the 
decision-making abilities of workers, either positively or negatively.  
Background Check: Twelve platforms do not require a background check. No Capital 
Labor platform required a background check, and of the Virtual Labor platforms, only two (the 
Therapy platforms) out of eight required a background check. Virtual and Capital platforms may 
offer avenues for workers who cannot pass a background check to earn money in the gig 
economy. Conversely, all the Local Labor platforms either required workers to pass a screener or 
background check, possibly due to the potential safety and liability concerns associated with 
workers working in close proximity to the client. The presence of a background check does not 
appear to differ greatly from platforms’ traditional counterparts. For example, while Uber drivers 
must pass background checks, taxi drivers generally have to as well. For this reason, this 
attribute is likely less interesting to organizational theorists.  
Other Requirements: The requirements of workers vary largely by the type of platform. 
For six platforms, the worker requirements vary by the type of task, and the client could adjust 
the requirements to suit the client’s needs. For instance, Housework clients may require workers 
to have several years of experience, a car, first aid certification, and other prerequisites. The 
other 14 platforms have at least one requirement to work on the platform, such as a driver’s 
license or a professional skill. However, the requirements in some cases may be fewer than many 
traditional equivalents, which could provide an avenue for new workers to enter a field. While 
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employers traditionally may not want to take a risk on hiring a worker without a certain degree 
or other qualification, platforms offer clients a comparatively inexpensive and low-risk way to 
test out a worker’s capabilities. For example, employers in traditional working environments 
may require that a data analyst have a STEM degree, but platforms may afford workers the 
opportunity to demonstrate their skills and build up their resume in the process.  
Finally, I analyze the Financial Arrangements and Worker Incentives attribute set:  
Worker Paid Through Platform: Out of the twenty platforms examined, only the two 
Hiring platforms (ZipRecruiter and Glassdoor) do not offer the option of paying the worker 
through the platforms’ infrastructure. Sixteen of the platforms require that workers use the 
platform to handle payments, and the two Housework platforms (Care.com and Sittercity) made 
payment through the platform optional. Ticona and Mateescu (2018) in their study of Housework 
platforms found that the platforms represent an attempt to formalize previously informal forms 
of work, such as babysitting. Workers paid through platforms are subject to increased visibility 
of their pay to institutions such as the IRS. For example, workers who traditionally had received 
all or some of their income under the table may no longer have the ability to shield their earnings 
from institutions. As discussed earlier in my analysis of Housework platforms, platform work 
may provide an interesting pathway for invisible and arguably illegal arrangements into legal 
arrangements. A policing or officiating element arises in platforms that allow or require 
payments to occur directly through the platform. 
Who Decides Price: Eight of the platforms do not offer the worker any control over the 
price charged to the client. Of those platforms, the two Therapy platforms charge clients a flat 
subscription per month, while the remaining platforms used an algorithm that decides the price 
based on a variety of factors, such as the distance the worker has to travel. The lack of autonomy 
36 
 
in pricing could have both positive and negative implications for workers. Having no control 
over price could reduce the stress or cognitive load involved in negotiating or determining the 
price. On the other hand, workers in this arrangement cannot negotiate for higher wages. 
Five of the platforms require workers to negotiate and agree with clients on the price. 
Other platforms either have the client or worker set the price ahead of time. Only the two 
Microwork platforms have the client set the price, while the remaining five platforms (including 
all Capital Labor platforms) allowed the worker to set the price. The ability to set prices could 
serve as an interesting reflection of the relative power each party has on a given platform. For 
instance, clients set the price on Microwork platforms, such as on Mechanical Turk, a platform 
that Irani and Silberman (2013) asserted privileges the client over the worker. The privileging of 
client priorities on platforms is unsurprising given the highly rationalized and repetitive nature of 
much of the work performed. Workers with rationalized tasks have power in traditional work 
only to the extent they have unions, and the lack of face to face interaction among workers 
makes such organizing impossible. Workers therefore must rely on third party websites or 
applications to organize against or protest poor wages, which may prove impossible to do. 
However, platforms that allow the worker to set the price or permit a negotiation between the 
parties allow the worker to exercise more discretion, similar to how they have done traditionally. 
Yet, the platforms afford clients the ability to quickly compare (and in some cases, filter out) 
workers that request higher wages. Organizational researchers will need to uncover what 
methods workers utilize to express their value to clients, and therefore can demand higher wages. 
Wage Guarantee: The presence of a wage guarantee varies highly by platform class. All 
Local Labor platforms had at least a conditional wage guarantee, but outside of the Local Labor 
platforms only the two Therapy platforms (Betterhelp and Talkspace) exhibit a guaranteed wage. 
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Overall, only half of all platforms examined in this study offer the ability to receive a guaranteed 
wage, and even for those platforms, the wage was sometimes conditional on worker performance 
or is simply the legally minimum wage. A lack of reliable or steady income could have important 
implications for the well-being of workers. For example, workers with perceived chronic job 
insecurity have reported negative health impacts (Ferrie, Shipley, Stansfeld, & Marmot, 2002). 
The lack of a guaranteed wage could pose threats to workers in poverty living from paycheck to 
paycheck, as receiving less than expected revenues could result in missed payments and 
increased debt.  
Platform Fee: Six platforms do not charge workers to use the platform and instead only 
charged the client. The remaining platforms generally take a cut of the worker’s earnings for 
each transaction. In this manner, platforms less resemble traditional employers and instead may 
be analogous to government entities. Like governments, platforms provide the infrastructure (or, 
for platforms, cyberinfrastructure) for workers to find work. In exchange for this infrastructure, 
governments and platforms take a percentage of the workers received income. However, on 
platforms, the workers can exercise little control over the “tax rate”, and cannot vote to reduce it. 
By the same token, workers cannot vote to increase the platform fee to support the development 
of new features. The platform will likely decide a fee that maximizes profit, not worker benefit. 
Consequently, the platform fees charged to work likely may be negatively correlated with 
the number and relative size of competitors. For example, workers on Video platforms have few, 
if any, alternative means to monetize their video or streaming content, and the Video platforms 
charged the highest percentage fee for workers, with both YouTube and Twitch.tv taking 
between a 45 to 50% cut of the workers’ earnings. Additionally, Capital Labor platforms tended 
to have lower platform fees than the other two classes of platforms, possibly due to the relative 
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ease of selling or renting goods on a variety of offline and online means. My findings provide 
some amount of evidence to support this claim; additional data collection could confirm it. The 
number of competitors could also be correlated with how well platforms treat workers in other 
respects. For example, if Uber competitors begin offering a new service or feature (e.g., free car 
washes), Uber may feel compelled to offer similar services to avoid losing workers to competing 
platforms.  
Negative Consequences for Declining: On seven of the platforms, workers can face 
negative repercussions for declining a job. The consequences generally are fairly minor and 
varied by platform; for Lyft, a worker declining a ride would hurt her acceptance rate, which 
determines her eligibility for certain features of the platform. For Fiverr, declining requests could 
hamper workers’ visibility in search results. The presence of negative consequences could 
represent a relative loss of autonomy compared to traditional independent contractors who often 
have great flexibility in deciding who to work for and what jobs to take. Conversely, workers in 
traditional firms generally cannot turn down tasks. This ability to decline, albeit with penalties, 
places the autonomy of platform workers somewhere in-between traditional firm employees and 
independent contractors. Research can uncover how workers feel about the negative 
consequences for declining and how the threat of punishment affects decision making in this 
area.  
Gamification Methods: Scheiber (2017) noted in The New York Times that while 
companies have long used psychological tricks (such as gamification) to encourage workers to 
purchase goods and services, the attempt by platforms to extend such strategies to the workforce 
could be transformative. Platforms’ apps can use visualization techniques (such as a progress 
bar) that allow workers to easily see the progress they make towards goals in real time. The app 
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can even provide extra stimuli (e.g. a small fireworks display combined with a pleasant tune) 
when the worker reaches a goal or milestone, much like when a player completes a level in a 
game. Despite their potential, only seven platforms use gamification methods to incentivize or 
motivate patterns of behavior in workers, though perhaps such techniques are only necessary for 
certain types of work. The Transportation and Delivery platforms provided additional incentives 
for workers during high demand periods. Uber, for example, offers “quests” for drivers to 
complete a certain number of trips within a period of time to receive a reward (e.g., provide 15 
trips during the weekend to earn $50). In this way, gamification methods signify an attempt to 
control worker behavior on platforms that often boast about the freedoms afforded by the 
platform. For example, Uber, on their “Why drive with us” page, advertises the flexibility 
afforded by the platform that allows workers to set their own hours.  
Interestingly, only one Virtual Labor platform uses gamification strategies. Perhaps this 
is because most of the work performed on Virtual Labor platforms can be done at any time, thus 
reducing the need to encourage workers to work during high demand times. However, Virtual 
Labor platforms could still use gamification methods to encourage other types of behavior. For 
example, YouTube gives physical trophies, known as YouTube Play Buttons, to workers who hit 
certain subscriber milestones, which provides an additional incentive for workers to remind 
clients to “subscribe” to their channel. No Capital Labor platforms appeared to offer gamified 
incentives, though workers could adjust their prices to match the demand for clients during peak 
periods. 
Possibility for Advancement: Nine platforms offer some way for workers to achieve a 
“promotion” or similar status upgrade. Workers can achieve these status upgrades by 
maintaining good performance and consistent work over time. Generally, these status upgrades 
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gave the workers additional advantages and privileges. On Airbnb, for example, workers can 
become “Superhosts” by receiving high ratings from clients and maintaining high performance 
metrics. Superhosts are more likely to be featured in guest search results, emails, and more. 
Clients can also use filters to exclusively see Superhosts.  
Platforms have struggled with retaining workers over time; over half of workers using 
online labor platforms stop working on the platform within one year (Farrell and Greig, 2016). 
Platforms that offer the ability to rise in status (akin to traditional promotions) could motivate 
workers to continue working on platforms long term. Additionally, advancement possibilities 
could motivate workers to stay with one platform and neglect competing platforms to achieve a 
certain status level. These advancement opportunities show how traditional mechanisms in 
employing firms have creeped into platforms, rendering the concerns of platforms similar to 
those of the employers they claim to be different from. Organizational theorists may find it 
interesting to discover how effective such incentives are at motivating workers and if they 
effectively substitute for promotions present in traditional forms of work. 
4. Discussion and Implications 
The analysis conducted in this paper contributes to our understanding of platforms and 
why certain platform attributes may have important implications for organizational theory. 
Platforms with a short or medium-term “duration of service” appear to disrupt the social contract 
between workers and employers by reducing typical worker-employer bonds and eliminating 
certain long-term employment benefits, such as healthcare insurance. Additionally, certain 
platform attributes reduce the need for human management traditionally performed by 
organizations. Rating systems offload management responsibilities to clients and algorithmic 
matching systems dramatically reduce the labor involved in finding prospective clients or 
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workers. Finally, attributes relevant to the incentive structure of platforms (e.g., gamification 
methods and possibility for advancement) could contribute to our understanding of worker 
motivation on platforms. Table 12 summarizes each attributes’ potential challenges to 
organizational theory. 
As Table 12 notes, some attributes pose less significant challenges to organizational 
theory, or may not matter at all. “Year founded,” for example, may contribute to our 
understanding of the history and possibly even the trends in the development of new platforms, 
but ultimately the year the platform was founded plays little role in what work is like on the 
platform. Other attributes pose little challenge to organizational theory due to a lack of 
differences to traditional counterparts. “Who Initiates Transaction,” for instance, largely does not 
represent a significant change to work as, for the most part, the same party initiates the 
transaction whether or not it occurs through a platform. All of the attributes in the “Information 
Exchange and Matching Process” attribute set had medium to low potential influence on 
organizational theory, which may indicate that the matching process in some respects does not 
differ greatly from how matches have been made traditionally; perhaps platforms simply 
facilitate the matching process rather than changing it on a fundamental level.  
We can extrapolate from the attributes of platforms to form an idea about which 
categories of platforms are the most theoretically interesting. For example, Transportation 
platforms have short durations of service, gamification methods, and algorithmic matching 
systems, a combination that suggests a high amount of theoretical potential (and somewhat 
justifies its popularity among academics).  
Conversely, this paper explains why certain categories of platforms may not represent 
significant departures from typical forms of work and the traditional social contract between 
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employers and employees. Platforms with attributes akin to their offline counterparts may 
represent less change for the lives of workers on a daily basis. Online labor platforms that offer 
long term employment options, such as the Housework platforms and Hiring platforms, run 
counter to some narratives of the gig economy. For example, Scholtz (2016) wrote about the 
possibility of the death of professions as more people’s jobs become “Uberized.” He observed 
that as workers move from traditional full-time workers to contingent workers, they lose benefits 
such as minimum wage and anti-discrimination employment protections. However, platforms 
that match workers with long term employment opportunities may reinforce traditional 
employment norms. In fact, platforms may represent attempts to formalize aspects of 
traditionally less formal work, as seen by Ticona and Mateescu’s (2018) analysis of carework (in 
this study, Housework) platforms. The existence of platforms that formalize hiring or reinforce 
traditional hiring practices (such as Hiring platforms) may help explain why the percentage of 
contingent workers has not substantially changed in the past 15 years (Appelbaum, Kalleberg, & 
Jin, 2019) despite the substantial growth of platforms as we entered the so-called “platform 
economy.”  
 Conclusions and Future Research  
Continued research on platforms will be important to understanding the future of the gig 
economy. Future research could examine the categories of platforms currently understudied by 
the literature. Notably, few studies appear to examine the lives of workers on Commerce, 
Therapy, and Housework platforms despite their unique potential for organizational theory. 
Ticona and Mateescu (2018) pointed out that despite the fact that housework platforms have had 
greater number of workers than transportation platforms, both public and scholarly discussion 
has focused on the male-dominated Uber, which suggests a gender bias in coverage. New 
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empirical work could help us understand how workers wrestle with the unique dynamics present 
in understudied platform categories.  
Additionally, future research could study some of the attributes more theoretically 
interesting that the literature does not currently address in detail, such as the presence of online 
communities. Research could analyze forum postings of platform workers within these 
communities to better understand what function these online communities play. These 
communities may supply an important outlet for bonding among highly separate and independent 
workers, or they could help workers manage and overcome issues with the platform that would 
typically be resolved by consulting management in a typical work environment. 
Not all gig jobs are alike; yet authors commonly paint the platforms that increasingly 
mediate and facilitate work with the same wide brush. This report reveals that online labor 
platforms differ extensively in their attributes, and the differences in these attributes have 
important ramifications for work and workers. Understanding these differences is key to 
discerning what platforms mean for the future of work.  
44 
 
 
Table 1. Platform Attributes 
 
Attribute 
Set 
General 
Information 
Information 
Exchange and 
Matching Process 
Financial 
Arrangements 
and Worker 
Incentives 
Attributes 
in the Set 
• Duration of 
Service 
• Arrangement 
Repeatable or 
Renewable 
• Self-Identifies as 
a Platform, 
• Year Founded 
• Rating or 
Feedback System 
• Presence of 
Online 
Communities 
• Who Initiates 
Transaction 
• Who Accepts 
Offer 
• Who Picks or 
Matches 
• Client Knows 
• Worker Knows 
• Background 
Check Required 
• Other 
Requirements 
• Worker Paid 
Through Platform  
• Who Decides 
Price 
• Wage Guarantee 
• Platform Fee, 
• Negative 
Consequences for 
Declining 
• Gamification 
Methods  
• Possibility for 
Advancement  
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Table 2. Platform Classes 
 
Classes of 
Platforms 
Local Online 
Labor Platforms 
Virtual Online 
Labor Platforms 
Capital Online 
Labor Platforms 
Categories 
of 
Platforms 
in Each 
Class 
• Transportation 
• Housework 
• Delivery 
• Hiring 
• Microwork 
• Therapy 
• Video 
• Professional 
Freelance 
• Hospitality 
• Commerce  
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Table 3. Local Online Labor Platforms – General Information Table 
Platforms: Uber Lyft Care.com Sittercity UberEats Postmates ZipRecruiter Glassdoor 
Type of 
Platform 
Transport Transport Housework Housework Delivery Delivery Hiring Hiring 
Duration of 
Service* 
Short 
Term  
Short 
Term 
Short, 
Medium, 
or Long 
Term 
Short, 
Medium, 
or Long 
Term 
Short 
Term 
Short 
Term 
Long Term Long 
Term 
Arrangement 
Repeatable 
or 
Renewable 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Self-
Identifies as 
a Platform 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Founded 
2009 2012 2007 2001 2014 2011 2010 2007 
Rating / 
Feedback 
System 
Two 
Way 
Two 
Way 
One Way Two Way Two 
Way3 
One Way None One Way 
Presence of 
Online 
Communities 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
 
  
                                                 
3 Both clients and restaurants rate workers, but the worker only rates the client  
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Table 4. Local Online Labor Platforms – Information Exchange and Matching Process 
Platforms: Uber Lyft Care.com Sittercity UberEats Postmates ZipRecruiter Glassdoor 
Who Initiates 
Transaction  
Client Client Either Party Either Party Client Client Client  Client 
Who Accepts 
Offer 
Worker Worker Mutual 
Acceptance 
Mutual 
Acceptance 
Worker Worker Mutual 
Acceptance 
Mutual 
Acceptance 
Who Picks or 
Matches  
Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Client Picks Either Can 
Contact 
Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Algorithmic 
Matching, 
or parties 
can contact 
Worker 
Applies 
Client 
Knows: 
Driver 
Rating, 
Name, 
Price, ETA 
Driver 
Rating, 
Name, 
Price, ETA 
Worker 
Rating, Price, 
Bio, 
Qualifications 
Worker 
Rating, Price, 
Bio, 
Qualifications 
Price, ETA Price, ETA Resume Resume 
Worker 
Knows: 
Rider 
Rating, 
Name, 
Distance, 
Pay 
Rider 
Rating, 
Name, 
Distance, 
Pay 
Distance, 
Dates, Pay, 
Job 
Description,  
Distance, 
Dates, Job 
Description,  
Distance to 
Restaurant 
Merchant 
name, 
location, 
delivery 
fee, # of 
deliveries 
Job 
description, 
company 
info, salary 
Job 
description, 
company 
info, rating, 
salary 
Background 
Check 
Required 
Yes Yes Optional Optional Yes Yes Optional 
(performed 
by client) 
Optional 
(performed 
by client) 
Other 
Requirements 
Documents, 
Drivers 
License 
Documents, 
Drivers 
License 
Varies by job Varies by job Documents, 
Drivers 
License  
Bike, car, 
or scooter 
Varies by 
job 
Varies by 
job 
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Table 5. Local Online Labor Platforms – Financial Arrangements and Worker Incentives 
Platforms: Uber Lyft Care.com Sittercity UberEats Postmates ZipRecruiter Glassdoor 
Worker Paid 
Through 
Platform 
Yes Yes Optional Optional Yes Yes No No 
Who Decides 
Price 
Algorithm Algorithm Negotiation Negotiation Algorithm Algorithm Negotiation Negotiation 
Wage 
Guarantee 
Conditional Conditional Minimum 
Wage 
Minimum 
Wage 
Yes Yes Minimum 
Wage 
Minimum 
Wage 
Platform Fee 20%  Variable %  Subscription 
(client pays)  
(optional 
worker 
subscription) 
Subscription 
(client pays) 
25% cut  20% cut Subscription 
(client pays) 
Subscription 
(client pays) 
Negative 
Consequences 
for Declining 
Work 
Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes No N/A N/A 
Gamification 
Methods 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Possibility for 
Advancement 
No No Yes Yes No Yes Not by 
Platform 
Not by 
Platform 
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Table 6. Virtual Labor Platforms – General Information Table 
Platforms: Mechanical 
Turk 
Microworkers Betterhelp Talkspace YouTube Twitch.tv Fivrr Upwork 
Type of 
Platform 
Microwork Microwork Therapy Therapy Video Video Professional 
Freelance 
Professional 
Freelance 
Duration of 
Service 
Short Term Short Term Medium 
or Long 
Term 
Medium 
or Long 
Term 
Short 
Term 
Short 
Term 
Short or 
Medium 
Term 
Short, 
Medium, or 
Long Term 
Arrangement 
Repeatable 
or 
Renewable 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self-
Identifies as 
a Platform 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Founded 
2005 2009 2013 2012 2005 2011 2010 2015 
Rating / 
Feedback 
System 
Yes 
(Approve / 
Dissaprove) 
Yes (Satisfied 
/ Dissatisfied)  
No No Yes 
(Thumbs 
up / 
Down) 
No Yes (one 
way) 
Yes (Two 
Way) 
Presence of 
Online 
Communities 
Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7. Virtual Labor Platforms – Information Exchange and Matching Process 
Platforms: Mechanical 
Turk 
Microworkers Betterhelp Talkspace YouTube Twitch.tv Fivrr Upwork 
Who Initiates Client Client Client Client Worker Worker Client Either Party 
Who Accepts 
Offer 
Worker Worker Automatic 
Acceptance 
Automatic 
Acceptance 
Client Client Worker Mutual 
Acceptance 
Who Picks or 
Matches  
Worker Worker Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Platform 
(Algorithm 
or Human) 
Client  Client Client Client 
Client 
Knows: 
No Info 
About 
Worker 
 
Nothing 
 
Worker Bio Worker 
Bio 
Video Title, 
Statistics, 
Worker 
Username, 
Rating 
Activity, 
Viewership, 
Worker 
Username,  
Price, Gig 
Description, 
Membership, 
Worker Bio, 
Rating 
Price, 
Worker bio, 
success rate 
Worker 
Knows: 
Payment 
amount, 
successful 
%, time to 
finish, job 
title,  
Payment 
amount, 
successful %, 
time to finish, 
job title, 
description 
Info 
provided by 
client 
(such as 
reason for 
visit) 
Info 
provided 
by client 
(such as 
reason for 
visit) 
Viewer 
demographics  
Number of 
viewers 
Job specific 
info given by 
client 
Job Specific 
info given 
by client 
Background 
Check 
Required 
No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Other 
Requirements 
Varies by 
Task 
Varies by 
Task 
Relevant 
Master’s 
Degree, 
Work 
Experience 
Relevant 
Master’s 
Degree, 
Work 
Experience 
Sufficient 
viewership, 
approval by 
human and 
algorithm 
Consistent 
Viewership, 
Approval 
by Human 
A 
Professional 
Skill 
A 
Professional 
Skill 
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Table 8. Virtual Labor Platforms – Financial Arrangements and Worker Incentives 
Platforms: Mechanical 
Turk 
Microworkers Betterhelp Talkspace YouTube Twitch.tv Fivrr Upwork 
Worker Paid 
Through 
Platform 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Who Decides 
Price 
Client Client Platform Platform Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Platform 
(Algorithm) 
Worker Negotiation 
Wage 
Guarantee 
No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Platform Fee 20% cut 
(client pays) 
7.5% cut + 
Listing Fee 
(client pays) 
Info Not 
Available 
Info Not 
Available 
45% cut 
 
Varies (up 
to 50%) 
 
20% 
 
20% 
(Decreases 
over time) 
Negative 
Consequences 
for Declining 
Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes No 
Gamification 
Methods  
Yes  Yes  No No Yes No No No 
Possibility for 
Advancement 
Yes (Can earn 
additional 
qualifications) 
Yes (Can 
become a 
“Best 
Worker”) 
No Yes, “Training 
and 
Professional 
Growth 
Opportunities” 
Indirect 
(can earn 
more 
through 
channel 
growth) 
Indirect 
(can earn 
more 
through 
channel 
growth) 
Yes 
(Fiverr 
Levels) 
Yes (Can 
become 
“top rated”)  
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Table 9. Capital Labor Platforms – General Information Table 
Platforms: AirBnB VRBO Etsy Artfire 
Type of 
Platform 
Hospitality Hospitality Commerce Commerce 
Duration of 
Service 
Medium 
or Long 
Term 
Medium 
or Long 
Term 
Short or 
Medium 
Term 
Short or 
Medium 
Term 
Arrangement 
Repeatable 
or 
Renewable 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self-
Identifies as 
a Platform 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Founded 
2008 1995 2005 2008 
Rating / 
Feedback 
System 
Two-Way Two-Way One-Way One-Way 
Presence of 
Online 
Communities 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10. Capital Labor Platforms – Information Exchange and Matching Process 
Platforms: AirBnB VRBO Etsy Artfire 
Who Initiates Clients Clients Clients Clients 
Who Accepts 
Offer 
Worker Worker Worker Worker 
Who Picks or 
Matches  
Client  Client  Client  Client 
Client 
Knows: 
Price, 
Rating, 
rental 
description 
Price, rating, 
rental 
description 
Seller 
rating, 
product 
description, 
price 
Seller Rating, 
product description, 
price 
Worker 
Knows: 
Reviews of 
client by 
other 
workers 
Guest name, 
Multiple rating 
(cleanliness, 
house rules, 
communication) 
Address, 
Buyer 
Messages 
Address, Buyer 
Messages 
Background 
Check 
Required 
No No No No 
Other 
Requirements 
Rental 
Unit 
Rental Unit Product for 
sale 
Product for sale 
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Table 11. Capital Labor Platforms – Financial Arrangements and Worker 
Incentives 
Platforms: Airbnb VRBO Etsy Artfire 
Worker Paid 
Through 
Platform 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Who Decides 
Price 
Worker Worker Worker Worker 
Wage 
Guarantee 
No No No No 
Platform Fee “Generally” 
3% 
6-12% Listing + 
Transaction 
Fees 
Listing + Transaction 
Fees 
Negative 
Consequences 
for Declining 
Depends on 
Circumstance 
Yes No Info not available 
Gamification 
Methods 
No No No No 
Possibility for 
Advancement 
Yes (Become 
a ‘Superhost’ 
and Airbnb 
plus 
No No No 
 
  
55 
 
 
Table 12. Attributes and Their Potential Impact on Organizational Theory 
Attributes Impact on 
Org 
Theory 
Why the attribute may or may not pose challenges to organizational theory or represent a 
departure from traditional forms of work. 
Duration of 
Service 
High The duration of service plays an important role in determining to what degree a platform 
enables “new forms of work.”. To the extent that platform work is characterized by short term 
working arrangements, it appears to represent a striking lessening of the social contract between 
employer (here, client) and worker. 
Arrangement 
Repeatable or 
Renewable 
Low The presence of repeatable arrangements across most of the platforms may allow for workers to 
build some of the relationships that workers might experience in traditional working 
environments. 
Self-Identifies as 
a platform 
High Platforms position themselves as a “third party” within the social contract between clients and 
workers. While platforms may not be employers in the traditional sense, they exert significantly 
more control over the worker than the client does. 
Year Founded Low The founding dates provide some insight into the timeline of the gig economy, but matter little 
for day-to-day work. 
Rating or 
Feedback System 
High The effects of rating systems are significant; they have homogenizing effects, are prone to bias, 
and can alter worker behavior. Platform rating systems promote a significantly different form of 
evaluation not present in traditional working environments. 
Presence of 
Online 
Communities 
Medium Online communities may provide a substitute for the interpersonal relationships that workers 
might form with peers in traditional workplace. Nevertheless, these relationships may feel less 
personal, and are also subject to monitoring by clients and employees of the platforms. 
Who Initiates 
Transaction 
Low The party that initiates the transaction does not differ greatly from traditional counterparts. 
Who Accepts 
Offer 
Low The party that accepts the offer does not differ greatly from traditional counterparts. 
Who Picks or 
Matches 
Medium The platforms that take control of the matching process mark a significant departure from 
traditional practices and places the platform in an important position of power, though only six 
platforms take control of the matching process. 
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Table 12, cont. 
Client Knows Medium The amount of information available affects the visibility of workers. High visibility can help 
clients make hiring decisions, while low visibility depersonalizes the worker and conceals the 
treatment workers receive.  
Worker Knows Medium Worker knowledge is important to organizational theory in cases that it differs from the 
information normally available to workers in their traditional equivalents as it may affect the 
decision-making abilities of workers both positively or negatively. 
Background 
Check Required 
Low Workers who have traditionally undergone background checks also undergo background checks 
on platforms. 
Other 
Requirements 
Low Workers in traditional working arrangements have generally needed some qualifications to 
work, and platforms are no exception. 
Worker Paid 
Through Platform 
Medium For most platforms, the platform handles the payment process. A policing or officiating element 
arises in platforms that allow or require payments to occur directly through the platform. 
Who Decides 
Price 
Medium Almost half the platforms do not allow the worker to negotiate prices, which shows a lack of 
power for workers on platforms. 
Wage Guarantee Medium Wage guarantees can offer workers some income security, though only half do so. 
Platform Fee Low The amount that the platforms charge matters little for day-to-day for work.  
Negative 
Consequences for 
Declining  
Medium This ability to decline, albeit with penalties, places the autonomy of platform workers 
somewhere in-between traditional firm employees and independent contractors. 
Gamification 
Methods 
High Gamification methods allow platforms to incentivize worker behavior in novel ways. 
Possibility for 
Advancement 
High Organizational theorists may find it interesting to discover how effective advancement 
opportunities are at motivating workers and if such opportunities effectively substitute for 
promotions present in traditional forms of work. 
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